Curefoods India Limited IPO

01At a glance

What the company does — an internet-driven, multi-brand food services company offering many cuisines through delivery and non-delivery channels: cloud kitchens, kiosks and restaurants (DRHP p.29). It had ten key brands, including Krispy Kreme, and 502 service locations at March 2025 (DRHP p.208, DRHP p.257).

Who pays it — diners, mostly ordering through food aggregators; the delivery channel was 82.20% of FY25 revenue (DRHP p.34). Average daily sales were ₹20.43 million in FY25 (DRHP p.208).

Why it is raising money — ₹1,525.35 million for new cloud kitchens, restaurants, kiosks and Krispy Kreme outlets and equipment; ₹1,269.25 million to repay borrowings; ₹400.00 million for lease payments; ₹1,314.31 million to acquire further stakes in subsidiaries; smaller sums for a subsidiary's new kitchens, marketing and a deferred acquisition payment; and the rest for unidentified acquisitions and general purposes (our arithmetic, DRHP p.30).

How fast it has grown — revenue from ₹3,820 million in FY23 to ₹5,851 million in FY24 and ₹7,458 million in FY25 (DRHP p.32).

The one thing to understand — a fast-growing, loss-making business that the IPO would fund. Losses were ₹3,427.32 million, ₹1,726.10 million and ₹1,699.68 million in FY23 to FY25, and operating cash outflow totalled ₹4,041.54 million over the three years, while about a sixth of the fresh issue goes to buying out minority holders in its own subsidiaries (our arithmetic, DRHP p.30, DRHP p.32, DRHP p.56).

02The business, in plain words

A cloud-kitchen company runs kitchens without dining rooms that cook for several online brands at once, and takes orders mainly through food-delivery apps; it also runs kiosks and restaurants.

A customer in Bengaluru orders a meal on a delivery app → the order goes to a Curefoods kitchen cooking under one of its brands → the meal is delivered → Curefoods is paid for the order through the app.

Earnings equation: Profit ≈ orders × average order value × (1 − food cost − aggregator commission) − kitchen rent, staff and marketing − depreciation and interest. Adjusted EBITDA margin was negative 10.11% in FY25 (DRHP p.208).

03Where the money comes from

Source: DRHP p.34, DRHP p.208.

04The growth record

Source: DRHP p.32, DRHP p.56, DRHP p.208. Adjusted EBITDA excludes share-based payments, impairments, fair-value changes and other items listed by the company (DRHP p.208).

05What the growth is made of

More locations. Service locations rose from 277 to 502 in two years and average daily sales roughly doubled (DRHP p.208). The share of non-delivery sales rose from 13.49% to 17.80% (our arithmetic, DRHP p.34).

06Earnings quality

Losses have narrowed but remain large. Reported EBITDA was negative ₹575.85 million in FY25, and adjusted EBITDA, which adds back some items and deducts others, was negative ₹753.83 million (DRHP p.208). Return on net worth was negative 31.29% in FY25 (DRHP p.32). Financing inflows of ₹1,990.55 million in FY25 covered the cash used (DRHP p.56).

07The balance sheet

Source: DRHP p.32, DRHP p.56. Before the red herring prospectus, 251,835 preference shares will convert into up to 216,651,750 equity shares (DRHP p.30).

08What the money is for

Source: DRHP p.30. The second and fourth rows are our arithmetic; the Munchbox stake alone is ₹798.39 million (DRHP p.30). A pre-IPO placement of up to ₹1,600 million may be made (DRHP p.31).

09Who is selling

Source: DRHP p.31. The second, third and last rows are our arithmetic. The offer for sale is up to 48,537,599 shares in total; the split between sellers is not given in the pages read (DRHP p.29).

10Promoters

The promoter is Ankit Nagori, who holds 27.80% on a fully diluted basis (DRHP p.29, DRHP p.31). Four criminal proceedings are pending against the promoter, including first information reports from 2019 and a 2025 court notice (DRHP p.33, DRHP p.34).

11Who already owns it

Source: DRHP p.31. The second and last rows are our arithmetic.

12What changed just before the IPO

• Losses — adjusted EBITDA loss cut from ₹2,090 million to ₹754 million in two years (DRHP p.208).
• Borrowings — up ₹718 million in FY25 (DRHP p.32).
• Growth — revenue growth slowed from 53% to 27% (DRHP p.208).

13Capacity and expansion

Capacity is kitchens and outlets: 502 service locations at March 2025 (DRHP p.208). The proceeds fund new cloud kitchens, restaurants, kiosks and Krispy Kreme outlets, and brand additions to existing kitchens (DRHP p.30).

14Market size and industry structure

The industry report cited in the offer document describes India's food-services market across quick-service restaurants, cloud kitchens, casual and fine dining and other formats (DRHP p.29). The summary read gives no market figures.

15Competitive position

What the document claims, and what it rests on:

• Many brands — ten key brands across cuisines and price points (DRHP p.257).
• Multiple channels — delivery, kiosks and restaurants (DRHP p.29).
• Growth — revenue nearly doubled in two years (DRHP p.208).

Against that: dependence on food-delivery apps, continued losses, and the cost of buying out minority holders (DRHP p.30, DRHP p.34).

16Peers the company named

Source: DRHP p.207. The table also lists Sapphire Foods India and Westlife Foodworld; the peers' average P/E is 863.40 (DRHP p.205, DRHP p.207).

No P/E is possible for the company until a price band is set, and it made a loss in FY25.

17Risks, in plain words

• Losses. Losses in each of the three years (DRHP p.32).
• Aggregators. 82% of revenue through delivery apps (DRHP p.34).
• Cash burn. Operating cash outflow each year (DRHP p.56).
• Many brands. Managing and launching brands is costly (DRHP p.34).
• Promoter matters. Criminal proceedings pending against the promoter (DRHP p.33).

18Litigation and regulatory matters

Source: DRHP p.33. The criminal matters include 2019 first information reports against Ankit Nagori and a February 2025 notice to the company directing Ankit Nagori to appear before a magistrate (DRHP p.34).

19Related-party transactions

Not read in detail for this study.

20What the offer document does not say

In the sections read for this study, the document does not give:

• How the ₹798.39 million price for the further Munchbox stake was set, in the pages read.
• How many shares each investor is offering, in the pages read.
• What the criminal proceedings against the promoter concern, beyond the sections cited (DRHP p.34).
• Revenue by brand, in the pages read.
• The price band, lot size or issue dates, which is normal at DRHP stage.

21Five questions for management

1. When does the company expect adjusted EBITDA to turn positive?
2. Why use ₹1,314 million of IPO money to acquire minority holdings in subsidiaries?
3. How dependent are margins on aggregator commission rates?
4. Which brands make money today, and which do not?
5. What are the criminal proceedings against the promoter about?

1Sources and cited facts

This study was read from 1 document the company filed. The 30 figures it cites are listed under the document each came from, with the page and the sentence as printed.