Jay Jagdamba Limited IPO

01At a glance

What the company does: melts stainless-steel scrap and ferro-alloys into billets and ingots, and rolls and machines them into bars, wire, flanges and seamless pipes, sold business to business (AP p.3).

Who pays it: distributors and industrial buyers in India and abroad; exports were 34.53% of FY26 revenue and Maharashtra 58.97% (DRHP p.28). The ten largest customers were 53.90% of revenue (DRHP p.33).

Why it is raising money: ₹4,500 million of the fresh issue repays borrowings and the rest is for general purposes; the offer for sale proceeds go to Floral Life Pte. Limited, a promoter (DRHP p.120, AP p.1).

How fast it has grown: revenue from ₹14,787 million in FY24 to ₹31,621 million in FY26, and profit after tax from ₹515 million to ₹2,619 million (AP p.7).

The one thing to understand: two things sit behind the headline numbers. A state capital-subsidy scheme contributed ₹1,736.35 million to FY26 revenue, about 30% of that year's EBITDA (DRHP p.42, AP p.7). And the two founding promoters are named in a police chargesheet over the diversion of another company's IPO proceeds, and are under investigation by the Economic Offences Wing and the Enforcement Directorate (DRHP p.25).

02The business, in plain words

A stainless-steel long-products maker buys scrap and alloys, melts them into semi-finished billets, and then rolls, draws and machines those billets into bars, wire, pipes and flanges. Profit depends on the spread between scrap and alloy prices and the price of the finished product, and on how much of the output goes into higher-value shapes.

An engineering company, pipe fabricator or distributor needs stainless bars or pipes → it orders from Jay Jagdamba → the company melts scrap at Wada, casts billets and rolls, machines or pierces them into the finished product → it ships the product in India or for export and is paid per tonne.

The company operates in four segments, billets and ingots, rolled and bright bars, flanges, and seamless pipes, which it began making in November 2024 (AP p.3). Both plants are in Wada, Palghar district, Maharashtra; the land under the second plant and parts of the first is not owned by the company (DRHP p.26).

Earnings equation: Revenue ≈ tonnes sold × price per tonne. In FY26 it sold 62,926 tonnes, and the document gives EBITDA of ₹92,822 a tonne (AP p.8).

03Where the money comes from

Source: AP p.3. The last row combines job work and traded goods.

Other operating income is almost all the state incentive: ₹341.96 million in FY24, ₹1,304.86 million in FY25 and ₹1,736.35 million in FY26 (AP p.3).

Source: DRHP p.28.

The largest customer was 8.56% of FY26 revenue, the top five 33.99% and the top ten 53.90% (DRHP p.33, DRHP p.232). Most did not consent to be named; Evergreen Recyclekaro is named among FY26's top ten (DRHP p.33).

04The growth record

Source: AP p.7.

Source: AP p.8.

05What the growth is made of

Price and mix more than volume. Total tonnes sold were flat from FY24 to FY25 and rose 27% in FY26, while revenue more than doubled over the two years (AP p.7, AP p.8). The mix moved to finished products: rolled and bright products went from 47.65% of revenue to 60.15%, and seamless pipes appeared (AP p.3). Gross margin rose from 18.89% to 24.86% (AP p.7).

EBITDA per tonne tripled, from ₹31,100 in FY24 to ₹92,822 in FY26 (AP p.8). Part of that is the state incentive, which counts in revenue and so in EBITDA: ₹1,736.35 million in FY26 is about ₹27,600 a tonne sold (our arithmetic on DRHP p.42 and AP p.8).

Exports grew from ₹2,431 million to ₹10,918 million (DRHP p.28).

06Earnings quality

The incentive matters. Under Maharashtra's Package Scheme of Incentives 2013, for units in less-developed zones, the company booked ₹1,736.35 million in FY26 to 5.49% of revenue and about 30% of EBITDA, our arithmetic (DRHP p.42, AP p.7). The document lists withdrawal or change of these incentives as a risk (DRHP p.42).

Cash lagged profit. Operating cash flow was ₹722.23 million in FY26 against profit of ₹2,619.17 million, and ₹517.03 million in FY25 against ₹1,609.93 million (AP p.7). Working capital was 106 days of revenue in FY26, up from 91 (AP p.7). Trade receivable days were 80 in FY24, 112 in FY25 and 94 in FY26 (DRHP p.51).

07The balance sheet

Source: AP p.7.

Net worth jumped in FY25 from ₹6,118 million to ₹16,315 million, more than that year's profit (AP p.7); the document's capital-structure chapter has the share issues behind it. Some unsecured loans, including from promoters, are repayable on demand (DRHP p.39).

08What the money is for

Source: DRHP p.120.

A pre-IPO placement of up to ₹1,200 million may be made and would reduce the fresh issue (DRHP p.120). The offer is made under Regulation 6(1) (AP p.1).

09Who is selling

Source: AP p.1.

Floral Life holds 66,013,805 shares, 32.16% before the offer (AP p.6). Its average cost of ₹184.35 is far above the other promoters', ₹11.15 for Narayan Prasad Malpani, ₹7.25 for Ram Prakash Malpani and ₹5.00 for the NPM Family Trust (AP p.9).

10Promoters

The promoters are Narayan Prasad Malpani, chairman and whole-time director; Ram Prakash Malpani, managing director; Hari Prakash Malpani; Floral Life Pte. Limited; and the NPM Family Trust (AP p.5). The board has six directors, three of them independent (AP p.10).

The document's first risk factor concerns the promoters. Narayan Prasad Malpani and Ram Prakash Malpani are among 82 persons and entities named in a chargesheet arising from a 2013 police complaint about the diversion of ₹290 million of IPO proceeds of Ravikumar Distilleries; it alleges ₹10.40 million was routed through a promoter-group company then called Shree NPM Real Estate, now Gyana Realestate (DRHP p.25). Non-bailable warrants issued in 2020 were withdrawn in 2022 (DRHP p.25). The promoters and some promoter-group members are also under investigation by the Economic Offences Wing and the Enforcement Directorate (DRHP p.25). The company says it has no relationship with Ravikumar Distilleries (DRHP p.25).

Separately, a promoter-group member, Narbada Devi, is listed as a defaulter on the Watchout Investors website (DRHP p.34), and the document reports factual inaccuracies in four of the company's corporate records (DRHP p.38).

11Who already owns it

Source: AP p.6.

Promoters and promoter group hold almost all of the 205,284,701 shares; the largest outside holder has 0.10% (AP p.6).

12What changed just before the IPO

• Net worth: rose from ₹6,118 million at March 2024 to ₹16,315 million at March 2025 (AP p.7).
• Seamless pipes: production began in November 2024, and capacity was raised from 12,000 to 29,450 tonnes a year in FY26 (AP p.3, DRHP p.31).
• Borrowings: up from ₹8,557 million to ₹13,386 million in FY26 (AP p.7).
• Bonus issue: one share for every share held in March 2025, 99,004,899 shares at nil consideration, the last allotment before the offer (DRHP p.104).
• Auditor: no change of statutory auditor in the three years before the filing (DRHP p.90).
• Company form: the company became a public limited company in May 2011 (DRHP p.3).

13Capacity and expansion

Source: DRHP p.31, as certified by an independent chartered engineer.

Installed capacity is higher than available capacity in every line, melting is 84,000 tonnes installed against 48,000 available, because the document measures available capacity from average daily availability (DRHP p.31). The new seamless-pipe and flange lines are still lightly used.

14Market size and industry structure

Global stainless-steel demand grew from 43.8 million tonnes in 2020 to 52.0 million tonnes in 2024, according to the CRISIL report cited in the offer document, which forecasts 62 to 65 million tonnes by 2030 (AP p.5). Those forecasts are CRISIL's, and newboard has not tested them. Pricing in the industry follows raw-material costs and economic cycles (DRHP p.54).

15Competitive position

What the document claims, and what it rests on:

• One of India's leading makers and exporters of stainless long and engineering products by FY26 revenue, per CRISIL (AP p.3).
• A widening product range from billets through to bars, flanges and seamless pipes (AP p.3).
• Location incentives under Maharashtra's scheme for less-developed zones (DRHP p.42).

Against that: concentration in one state and one site, no long-term supply contracts with most scrap suppliers, and larger listed competitors (DRHP p.25, DRHP p.27, DRHP p.43).

16Peers the company named

Source: DRHP p.137, DRHP p.138. P/E uses closing prices on 19 August 2026. *Excluded by the document from its average, Mukand for extraordinary income, Welspun Specialty as only recently profitable.

The document also names Suraj Limited, and gives an industry P/E range of 18.97 to 49.75, average 34.36 (DRHP p.137). For Jay Jagdamba it gives FY26 earnings per share of ₹12.84, net asset value per share of ₹101.75 and return on net worth of 12.54% (AP p.7, DRHP p.137). No P/E is possible for the company until a price band is set.

17Risks, in plain words

• The promoters' criminal case. The two founders are named in a chargesheet and are under EOW and ED investigation (DRHP p.25).
• State incentives. About 30% of FY26 EBITDA came from a state scheme that could end or change (DRHP p.42).
• Cash conversion. Operating cash flow was under a third of profit in FY25 and FY26 (AP p.7).
• One place. Both plants are at Wada, and 58.97% of revenue is in Maharashtra (DRHP p.28).
• Raw materials. Scrap and ferro-alloy prices drive costs, and most suppliers have no long-term contract (DRHP p.25, DRHP p.40).
• Leased land. The second plant and parts of the first stand on land the company does not own (DRHP p.26).
• Record-keeping. The document reports inaccuracies in four corporate records and unpaid challans for some filings with the Registrar of Companies (DRHP p.35, DRHP p.38).

18Litigation and regulatory matters

Source: AP p.10. Amounts are to the extent the document could quantify them.

Two further matters with the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence are disclosed separately (AP p.11).

19Related-party transactions

Related-party transactions made up 0.48% of total income, according to the document (AP p.9). The collection office in Mumbai is leased from Gyana Realestate, the promoter-group company named in the chargesheet; the second plant's land is leased from Jay Bhavani Metals, a company the promoters incorporated; and part of the first plant's land from Narayan Prasad Malpani (DRHP p.26, AP p.5). Some borrowings are unsecured loans from promoters, repayable on demand (DRHP p.39).

20What the offer document does not say

In the sections read for this study, the document does not give:

• Profit excluding the state incentive, or how long the incentive runs.
• Why the promoter company Floral Life paid ₹184.35 a share when the other promoters paid ₹5 to ₹11.
• The status of the Enforcement Directorate investigation.
• Why operating cash flow fell as profit rose.
• The price band, lot size or issue dates, which is normal at this stage.

21Five questions for management

1. How many more years does the Package Scheme of Incentives run for each plant, and what is the cap on total benefits?
2. What is the current stage of the chargesheet and of the EOW and ED investigations, and what would an adverse court outcome mean for the promoters' board roles?
3. Why did operating cash flow fall to ₹722 million in FY26 when profit was ₹2,619 million?
4. Who owns Floral Life Pte. Limited, and why is it the promoter that sells in the offer?
5. At 23% utilisation of seamless-pipe capacity, what volume does the company expect from the line in FY27?

2Sources and cited facts

This study was read from 2 documents the company filed. The 79 figures it cites are listed under the document each came from, with the page and the sentence as printed.