Moneyview Limited IPO

01At a glance

What the company does — runs the Moneyview app, which arranges personal loans and also offers earned-wage access, home loans, credit cards, insurance, digital gold and UPI; it acts as a lending service provider for 42 financial partners and lends directly through its NBFC subsidiary, Whizdm Finance (WFPL) (DRHP p.7, DRHP p.30).

Who pays it — borrowers in households earning ₹300,000 to ₹1,100,000 a year, through interest and fees, and partner lenders, through sourcing and servicing fees; it had 125.49 million registered users and 9.73 million monetised users at December 2025 (DRHP p.30, DRHP p.143).

Why it is raising money — ₹6,500.00 million to grow loans under default-loss-guarantee arrangements, ₹4,500.00 million into WFPL's capital, and the rest for general purposes (DRHP p.31).

How fast it has grown — revenue from ₹6,481 million in FY23 to ₹23,391 million in FY25, and ₹23,733 million in the nine months to December 2025 (DRHP p.34).

The one thing to understand — the company carries the credit risk of the loans it arranges. It guarantees partner lenders up to 5% of the portfolio against default, with ₹8,470.70 million of such guarantees outstanding at December 2025, and its impairment charge rose from ₹399 million in FY23 to ₹6,677 million in FY25 and ₹7,244 million in nine months (DRHP p.35, DRHP p.45, DRHP p.94).

02The business, in plain words

A digital lender finds borrowers through an app, scores them with its own models, and either passes the loan to a bank or NBFC partner — promising to absorb a share of losses — or lends from its own NBFC balance sheet. It earns fees and interest and pays for losses.

A salaried worker in a mid-sized city needs ₹100,000 → applies on the Moneyview app → the company's models approve the loan and a partner lender or WFPL disburses it → the borrower repays monthly; if the borrower defaults, the company bears the guaranteed share of the loss.

Loan disbursals were ₹176,211 million in FY25 and managed assets ₹198,148 million at December 2025 (DRHP p.143).

Earnings equation: Profit ≈ fees and interest on loans arranged or held − credit losses and guarantee payouts − customer acquisition and operating cost − interest on borrowings.

03Where the money comes from

Source: DRHP p.143. 9M FY26 is nine months to December 2025; AUM and users are at period end.

04The growth record

Source: DRHP p.34, DRHP p.94. 9M FY26 is nine months.

05What the growth is made of

More borrowers and more loans held or guaranteed. Monetised users rose from 2.15 million to 9.73 million, and managed AUM from ₹76 billion to ₹198 billion between March 2023 and December 2025 (DRHP p.143). Revenue grew 3.6 times from FY23 to FY25 while the impairment charge grew 16.7 times (our arithmetic, DRHP p.94). Disbursals in the nine months were already 92% of FY25's (our arithmetic, DRHP p.143).

06Earnings quality

Credit costs are the swing factor: impairment was 28.5% of revenue in FY25 and 30.5% in the nine months (our arithmetic, DRHP p.34, DRHP p.94). Gross Stage 3 loans were 3.37% of gross loans at March 2023, 0.94% at March 2024, 1.88% at March 2025 and 2.53% at December 2025 (DRHP p.46). In August 2025 WFPL suffered a cyber incident with a net cash loss of ₹469.99 million, shown as an exceptional item; ₹17.68 million had been recovered and an insurance claim was pending (DRHP p.331, DRHP p.364). There are no auditor qualifications that have not been given effect in the restated accounts (DRHP p.35).

07The balance sheet

Source: DRHP p.34.

Borrowings rose nineteen-fold from March 2023 to December 2025 (our arithmetic, DRHP p.34). Default-loss guarantees outstanding were ₹8,470.70 million at December 2025 (DRHP p.35).

08What the money is for

Source: DRHP p.31.

A pre-IPO placement of up to ₹3,000 million may reduce the fresh issue (DRHP p.30).

09Who is selling

Source: DRHP p.31. Sixteen shareholders offer 136,095,900 shares in all, including Accel Growth IV, Apis Growth II, NLI Strategic Venture Investment, TI JPNIN India Holdco, Evolvence India Fund IV, DI Investment, TI Platform SMRS SMA, Lok Capital entities and Chitra Agarwal of the promoter group (DRHP p.31).

10Promoters

The promoters are Puneet Agarwal, Sanjay Aggarwal and Sushma Abburi (DRHP p.30). The company bought back shares from key management personnel for ₹191.81 million and from other related parties for ₹130.58 million in FY23 (DRHP p.36).

11Who already owns it

Source: DRHP p.32.

The three promoters hold 19.55% on a fully diluted basis, and the promoter group, including the Agarwal Family Trust at 3.05%, a further 4.28% (our arithmetic, DRHP p.32).

12What changed just before the IPO

• Cyber incident — ₹470 million loss at WFPL in August 2025 (DRHP p.331).
• Credit costs — impairment above FY25's full-year level in nine months (DRHP p.94).
• Borrowings — up ₹16,670 million in nine months (our arithmetic, DRHP p.34).
• Rules — RBI's 2025 digital-lending directions govern the guarantees (DRHP p.45).

13Capacity and expansion

Capacity is capital and partner appetite: the proceeds add ₹4,500 million to WFPL's capital and ₹6,500 million to support guaranteed lending with partners (DRHP p.31).

14Market size and industry structure

The Redseer report cited in the offer document puts retail loan sanctions at ₹65 trillion in FY25 and projects ₹127–138 trillion by FY30, and says digital personal loans were 13% of unsecured personal loans sanctioned in FY25 (DRHP p.30). Those projections are Redseer's, and newboard has not tested them.

15Competitive position

What the document claims, and what it rests on:

• Scale — 125.49 million registered users and 42 financial partners (DRHP p.30).
• In-house AI/ML risk models used to personalise and price loans (DRHP p.30).

Against that: rising credit costs, guarantee exposure, regulatory change in digital lending, and a recent cyber loss (DRHP p.45, DRHP p.46, DRHP p.331).

16Peers the company named

Source: DRHP p.142. Peer P/E uses prices on 27 February 2026.

No P/E is possible for the company until a price band is set.

17Risks, in plain words

• Credit. Borrower defaults raise guarantee and impairment costs (DRHP p.45, DRHP p.46).
• Regulation. RBI rules on digital lending and guarantees (DRHP p.45).
• Funding. Borrowings have grown quickly (DRHP p.34).
• Cyber and data. A breach has already cost ₹470 million (DRHP p.364).
• Partners. Dependence on regulated lenders to fund loans (DRHP p.45).

18Litigation and regulatory matters

Source: DRHP p.35. No proceedings are listed by or against the company itself or the promoters (DRHP p.35).

19Related-party transactions

The FY23 buybacks from key management personnel and other related parties totalled ₹322.39 million (our arithmetic, DRHP p.36). Remuneration to key management personnel was ₹192.63 million in FY25 (DRHP p.36).

20What the offer document does not say

In the sections read for this study, the document does not give:

• How much DLG has actually been paid out to partners, in the pages read.
• Credit costs by lending channel — partner loans versus WFPL's own book.
• How the cyber incident happened beyond the forensic finding, in the pages read.
• Promoter backgrounds, in the pages read.
• The price band, lot size or issue dates, which is normal at DRHP stage.

21Five questions for management

1. How much has the company paid out under default-loss guarantees in each period?
2. Why did gross Stage 3 loans rise from 0.94% to 2.53% in 21 months?
3. What controls failed in the August 2025 cyber incident, and what has changed?
4. What share of revenue comes from WFPL's own lending versus partner fees?
5. Why are the founders selling shares in the IPO?

1Sources and cited facts

This study was read from 1 document the company filed. The 24 figures it cites are listed under the document each came from, with the page and the sentence as printed.