SS Retail Limited IPO

01At a glance

What the company does — sells mobile phones, accessories and other electronics through stores under the SS Mobile, Mobile Exchange Wala and The Mobile Space brands, in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Goa (DRHP p.26, DRHP p.286). It had 376 stores at June 2025 (DRHP p.180).

Who pays it — walk-in retail customers. Mobile phones were 87.68% of revenue in the three months to June 2025 (DRHP p.31). Maharashtra provided 95.25% of revenue and tier II and smaller cities 70.43% (DRHP p.31).

Why it is raising money — ₹124.53 million to fit out new stores in FY27 and FY28, ₹2,015.47 million for working capital, and the rest for general purposes (DRHP p.27).

How fast it has grown — revenue from ₹8,320 million in FY23 to ₹12,067 million in FY24 and ₹15,979 million in FY25, and ₹4,976 million in the three months to June 2025 (DRHP p.29).

The one thing to understand — a high-volume, thin-margin retailer that owns the stock in every store. Gross margin was 12.25% and PAT margin 2.99% in the June quarter, and inventory stays with the company even in franchise-run stores (DRHP p.180, DRHP p.286).

02The business, in plain words

A phone retailer buys handsets from brands and distributors, stocks them in small neighbourhood stores, and earns a margin on each sale plus sales incentives from the brands. It grows by opening stores, many of them run by local franchise partners.

A customer in a Maharashtra district town wants a new phone → the customer visits an SS Mobile store run by a local franchise partner → the phone on the shelf belongs to SS Retail, which bought it from the brand's distributor → the franchise partner earns a share, SS Retail keeps the rest of the margin.

Stores run under three models: company-owned and company-operated (COCO), company-owned and franchisee-operated (COFO), and franchisee-owned and franchisee-operated (FOFO) (DRHP p.286). COFO and FOFO stores were 72.05% of revenue in the June quarter (DRHP p.31).

Earnings equation: Profit ≈ phones sold × (retail price − purchase price) + brand incentives − store rent, staff and franchise payouts − interest. Operating EBITDA margin was 6.00% in the June quarter (DRHP p.181).

03Where the money comes from

Source: DRHP p.31. Q1 FY26 is three months.

Source: DRHP p.180.

04The growth record

Source: DRHP p.29, DRHP p.180, DRHP p.181, DRHP p.470. Q1 FY26 is three months.

05What the growth is made of

Mostly new stores. The store count nearly doubled from 181 to 347 between FY23 and FY25, and FY25 alone added 123 (DRHP p.180). Stores open since April 2022 grew sales at 13.43% a year from FY23 to FY25 (DRHP p.180). Gross margin also rose by about 2.6 percentage points (DRHP p.180).

06Earnings quality

Working capital absorbed the profit while the chain expanded: operating cash flow was negative ₹65.42 million over FY24 and FY25 against ₹665.06 million of profit, and turned to ₹498.60 million in the June quarter (our arithmetic, DRHP p.29, DRHP p.470). Net working capital days were 36 at June 2025 (DRHP p.181).

The summary gives basic EPS of ₹9.14 for the three months against ₹6.13 for FY25, although quarterly profit was ₹148.56 million against ₹398.61 million; the per-share figures reflect a stock split in August 2025 and a bonus issue in September 2025, and the two appear to use different share counts (DRHP p.29, DRHP p.419). There are no auditor qualifications not given effect in the restated accounts (DRHP p.30).

07The balance sheet

Source: DRHP p.29, DRHP p.181.

The company has issued compulsorily convertible debentures, which were left out of diluted EPS as anti-dilutive (DRHP p.29).

08What the money is for

Source: DRHP p.27.

09Who is selling

Source: DRHP p.28. Together they offer shares worth up to ₹2,000 million; the split was not read for this study (DRHP p.26).

10Promoters

The promoters are Siddharth Gunvant Shah, Deepa Siddharth Shah, Harshal Kishor Parekh and Bhavini Harshal Parekh (DRHP p.26). Promoters and promoter group hold 75.74% (DRHP p.28, our arithmetic).

11Who already owns it

Source: DRHP p.28. The last row is our arithmetic.

12What changed just before the IPO

• Stores — 123 opened in FY25, the most in any year shown (DRHP p.180).
• Share structure — a stock split in August 2025 and a bonus issue in September 2025 (DRHP p.419).
• Debt — borrowings cut from ₹1,254 million to ₹819 million in the June quarter (DRHP p.29).
• Cash — operating cash flow of ₹498.60 million in the June quarter (DRHP p.470).

13Capacity and expansion

Retail area was 191,233 square feet at June 2025 (DRHP p.180). The proceeds fund fit-outs for new stores and the inventory they need (DRHP p.27).

14Market size and industry structure

The Knowledge Company report cited in the offer document puts India's mobile-phone market at ₹3,226 billion in FY2024 and projects ₹5,198 billion by FY2030, and puts Maharashtra's market at ₹514 billion in FY2025 (DRHP p.26). Those projections are the report's, and newboard has not tested them. The report ranks the company as the largest mobile-phone retail chain in West India and fourth largest in India by store count among its peers (DRHP p.26).

15Competitive position

What the document claims, and what it rests on:

• Scale in Maharashtra, citing the Knowledge Company report (DRHP p.26).
• A franchise model with local partners whose income depends on store performance (DRHP p.286).

Against that: one state, one product category, ten suppliers for about 87–92% of purchases, and thin margins (DRHP p.31).

16Peers the company named

The document gives the listed peers' P/E range as 12.48 (Umiya Mobile) to 60.88 (Aditya Vision), average 28.84 (DRHP p.178). The full peer table was not read for this study.

No P/E is possible for the company until a price band is set.

17Risks, in plain words

• Phones. Nearly nine-tenths of revenue (DRHP p.31).
• Suppliers. Ten suppliers for most purchases (DRHP p.31).
• Maharashtra. 95% of revenue (DRHP p.31).
• Franchise model. Most revenue comes from franchise-run stores (DRHP p.31).
• Working capital. Inventory in every store (DRHP p.31).
• Store sites. Growth depends on finding locations (DRHP p.32).

18Litigation and regulatory matters

Source: DRHP p.30.

19Related-party transactions

Not read in detail for this study.

20What the offer document does not say

In the sections read for this study, the document does not give:

• Which brands and suppliers dominate purchases, by share, in the pages read.
• Who holds the convertible debentures and on what terms, in the pages read.
• What the civil claim against the subsidiary concerns, in the pages read.
• Why operating cash flow was negative in FY24 and near zero in FY25.
• The price band, lot size or issue dates, which is normal at DRHP stage.

21Five questions for management

1. What share of purchases comes from each phone brand, and on what credit terms?
2. How are franchise partners paid, and who bears losses at a closed store?
3. Why did 3.46% of stores close in FY25?
4. How much of gross margin comes from brand incentives rather than retail mark-up?
5. Who holds the convertible debentures, and at what price do they convert?

1Sources and cited facts

This study was read from 1 document the company filed. The 34 figures it cites are listed under the document each came from, with the page and the sentence as printed.